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The Impact of Medicare's Prospective Payment
System on Psychiatric Patients Treated in Scatterbeds
ABSTRACT
Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) for hospitals was phased—in
during the 1984 Federal Fiscal Year. While many providers of psychiatric in-
patient care were exempted from PPS patients treated in general hospital beds
outside of psychiatric units (scatterbeds) were not. This allows for an initial
assessment of the impact of PPS on psychiatric patients. We use a single
equation model of hospital length of stay to estimate the impact of PPS. We
allow for the possibility of both anticipating behavior and slow adjustment to
the new payment scheme. The results indicate a substantial response to PPS over
the first year of implementation. The estimated response includes sizable anti-
cipatory and slow adjustment components. The findings suggest that policy
discussions may be weighted too heavily in the direction of concern over hospi-
talfinancial status given the ability of hospitals to change their behavior.
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On October 1, 1983 the phase-in of the Medicare Prospective Payment
System (PPS) began. Although the general impression is that providers treating
Medicare psychiatric cases were exempted from PPS, that impression is
misleading. Only free standing psychiatric hospitals and psychiatric units in
general hospitals (which met certain qualifying conditions and applied for and
received an exemption) were exempted from PPS; other providers were not.' In
fiscal year 1984, 41 percent of psychiatric discharges which accounted for 29
percent of total charges for psychiatric Medicare cases, were paid for under
PPS. These patients received their care from general hospitals, either in the
so called "scatterbeds" or in nonexempt psychiatric units.
The overall objective of PPS was to stem the growth in hospital costs
while continuing to ensure the access of beneficiaries to quality health care
(Gutterman and Dobson, 1986). The system was designed to encourage the effi-
cient production of quality care. Clearly, the intent of PPS was to stimulate
significant behavioral changes (which could be called supply response) from the
providers of hospital services. However, a number of analysts (Goldman et al,
1984 McGuire et al, 1985 and Frank and Lave, 1986a) have raised concerns about
the nature of the supply response of mental health providers to the incentives
contained in a per case payment system. They have raised the possibility that
providers may undertreat mentally ill patients or transfer them inappropriately
to State mental hospitals. This concern is enhanced by the fact that the
Medicare outpatient benefits for psychiatric cases are more limited than those
for the general population.
In this paper we begin to evaluate the effect of PPS on psychiatric
care by examining the PPS associated changes in hospital lengths of stay of
Medicare psychiatric patients treated in scatterbeds. This represents but a—2-
beginning of a complete evaluation. An evaluation of the overall impact would
include an analysis of the factors leading to a psychiatric unit's exemption
from PPS, a systematic analysis of the distribution of Medicare patients across
types of facilities and any health effects associated with the changed beha-
viors. An examination of the more complete set of impacts must await future
research.
The paper is organized into six sections. The second section briefly
reviews recent contributions to the analysis of PPS applied to psychiatric
patients. The third section addresses some theoretical considerations that
arise in specification and interpretation of the empirical model of length of
stay. This is followed by a description of the empirical implementation of the
length of stay model. The last two sections present results and a discussion of
the implications and limitations of the research.
II. Recent Contributions to the Analysis of PPS and Psychiatric Patients
The introduction of the Medicare prospective payment system has stimu-
lated a significant amount of research by social scientists. PPS related
research can be classified into three categories: (1) studies which are con-
cerned with patient classification systems and their strengths and weaknesses
as the basis of a payment system; (2) simulations of the impact of changing the
structure of hospital payment systems and (3) analyses of the effect on hospital
length of stay, of hospital reimbursement systems which are similar to PPS.
Here, we discuss only behavioral and payment system related research. We do riot
review the research on classification systems. It has been reviewed elsewhere
(for example, McGuire et al. 1985), and the incentives and responses at issue
here would be substantially similar under any classification system so long as
payment is prospective.—3—
Two recent studies have attempted to simulate financial effects of PPS
on various types of hospitals which provide inpatient mental health care.
Freiman and colleagues (1986) assessed the financial implications of PPS
payments on exempt and non-exempt psychiatric units of general hospitals in
four states (Michigan, North Carolina, Washington, and New Jersey). The
simulations compared the revenues that a hospital would receive under the fully
phased in prospective payment system (that is the individual hospital payment
rates would be based on national costs as opposed to depending, in part, on the
hospital's own costs or the costs of the region in which it was located) with
the revenues it would receive under a cost based payment system. Freiman,
et al.(1986) found that exempt psychiatric units, assuming no supply response,
would incur losses in three of the four states. They also found that
psychiatric units which did not obtain an exemption would fare systematically
better under PPS than the exempt units. The implication of these results is not
entirely clear. Under PPS, the units would be expected to their change beha-
vior. Although total revenue from Medicare would decrease, it is possible that
costs could be reduced more than proportionately. Thus, the assumption of no
supply response to changed payment incentives makes any conclusion about the
effect of PPS on the hospital's financial status difficult to draw with
confi dence.
The study by the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals
(NAPPH) sought to address some of the same issues as the work by Freinian et al.
The NAPPH study was primarily concerned with whether private psychiatric hospi-
tals would be systematic winners or losers under the PPS system. The NAPPH
performed a variety of simulations of the financial impact of the fully phased
in PPS, as well as some potential modifications, on their member hospitals. The-4-
results of the simulations led the NAPPH to conclude that there would be
substantial redistribution of Medicare dollars among their sample hospitals.
This conclusions is difficult to interpret because the characteristics of the
winning and losing hospitals were not reported. As in the Freiman et al.
analysis, no behavioral responses to new incentives were permitted in the
analyses.
The second type of evidence on possible impacts of PPS on inpatient
psychiatric care is based on observations of hospital behavior under reimburse-
ment systems which contain some incentives similar to PPS. Rupp, Steinwachs,
and Salkever (1985) estimated the impact of a per case prospective payment
system on length of stay of psychiatric patients. Using data from the state of
Maryland the authors compared the length of stay of psychiatric patients
discharged from general hospitals paid under Maryland's Guaranteed Inpatient
Revenue (GIR) method with those discharged from the hospitals paid under a
prospective per service scheme. The GIR system put into place a projected case
mix adjusted revenue cap per case for all live discharges. If hospital revenues
either exceeded or fell short of the projected revenues, the hospital's rate was
adjusted in the following year. The Maryland GIR system is therefore a mix of
per case prospective payment and a budget review system. Thus, the incentives
to shorten length of stay are weaker under GIR than under PPS. The authors
estimated multiple regression models for roughly 11,000 discharges from Maryland
hospitals for the years 1977 through 1980. Their results indicate that lengths
of stay fell by from 5 to 7 per cent in hospitals under the per case system.
Rupp, Steinwachs and Salkever conclude that even under modest financial incen-
tives a decrease in length of stay was observed and therefore more stringent
policies might produce larger responses.—5—
A payment system which sets limits on reimburseable days per hospital
episode has incentives similar to PPS. Under such a system, the hospital
receives a fixed daily payment until the day limit is reached and then its
marginal revenue falls to zero. Under PPS, a hospital receives a fixed sum for
taking care of a patient. Thus, (unless the patient is classified as an
outlier), the hospital receives no marginal revenue, but does incur additional
costs, for each day of care provided. Frank and Lave (1986 b) analysed the
effect of setting limits on the number of reimburseable days by State Medicaid
programs. Using national data on Medicaid discharges from the psychiatric units
of general hospitals, they found that the imposition of a 25 day per episode
stay limit reduced length of stay by approximately 30 per cent. This is a very
large response. However, since the study population was based on a small sample
of Medicaid patients (976) discharged from psychiatric units (where the lengths
of stay tend to be quite long), the results should be considered only
suggestive of what might be found under PPS.
III. Theoretical Considerations
Under the Medicare propective payment system, a hospital receives a
fixed amount for providing services to a given patient. The payment varies with
the patient's DRG classification. If the patient is an "outlier patient", that
is, if he/she has, compared to the average patient in a DRG, either a significantly
longer length of stay or higher incurred costs, the hospital can receive addi-
tional payments. The revenues received under the fixed payments (plus the
outlier payments) are to cover the operating costs of treating Medicare
patients. Capital costs and most of the costs associated with graduate medical
education are paid for on a cost basis. Thus, compared to cost based reim-
bursement, PPS shifts some of the risk from Medicare to the hospital.-6-
Under PPS, the hospital receives a fixed dollar sum for taking care of
a patient regardless of the actual costs incurred in treating that patient. The
setting of a prospective payment means that net revenues are systematically
reduced for each unit of service provided the patient, where the reduction in
net revenues will depend on the marginal cost of producing the services. The
hospital has strong financial incentives to reduce the number of services pro-
vided. Since treatment costs have a strong positive relation to the patient's
length of stay, hospitals consequently have a strong motivation to reduce the
length of stay. However, other factors will moderate the incentives to decrease
length of stay that would result from the simple pursuit of profit maximization.
Some minimum level of quality must be maintained. In addition, some administra-
tors may want to provide care of slightly higher quality either for altruistic
purposes or to decrease the chances of being cited for malpractice. In addi-
tion, physicians are usually paid on a per visit basis and, therefore, have an
incentive to advocate for longer stays.
Sloan and Steinwald (1980), Ellis and McGuire (1986), and Seidman and
Frank (1986) have developed theoretical models of hospital behavior which have
incorporated factors other than the maximization of net revenue into the hospi-
tal's objective function. They have used these models to analyze how hospitals
would respond to the implementation of a per case prospective payment system.
The qualitative predictions of all the models are the same: relative to a cost
based payment system, the average length of stay will fall.
However, in the empirical analysis to be discussed below, we compare
the length of stay of Medicare psychiatric patients for whom the hospitals
were paid under PPS rules not with that of patients for whom hospitals were paid
under cost based rules but rather with that of patients for whom the hospitals-7-
were paid under TEFRA rules. Under TEFRA (the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982), hospitals' payments were based on the historical
cost of each hospital, an inflation adjustment, and hospital cost performance
relative to cost per admission targets. The provisions under TEFRA offer
incentives to reduce costs and length of stay by offering hospitals a share of
the savings. Hospitals are penalized for exceeding cost targets by having to
absorb 75% of the overrun. In addition, cost limits are specified (120% of
similar hospital costs) which if exceeded require a hospital to absorb 100% of
the excess. This means that below the cost limits there is "cost sharing" of
profits and cost overruns while above the cost limits the hospital absorbs all
losses. Thus, one might consider TEFRA a intermediate step between a cost based
and a PPS payment system, and therefore lengths of stay should be longer under
TEFRA than under PPS.
Since our empirical work is based on observations from the first year
of PPS phase-in, and because the payment system changed during the year for most
hospitals we may observe a disequilibrium situation. Because it is costly to
adjust to a new reimbursement system one might expect hospitals to begin a gra-
dual adjustment prior to the comencement of PPS in anticipation of the new
incentive structure.2 It is also possible that the adjustment process adopted
by the hospital would not lead to a new equilibrium level by the time PPS had
been implemented. The likelihood that hospitals do not instantaneously adjust
to new incentives means that in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the impact
of P1'S on length of stay, the empirical model must incorporate variables that
represent the dynamics of adjustment.-8-
IV. Empirical Implementation
a. The Data
The data set is composed of data from three sources of information.
They are: the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) Patient Billing
File (PATBILL) for fiscal year 1984, the American Hospital Association's (AHA)
Annual Survey of Hospitals for 1984, and the HCFA Provider of Service File (POS)
for November of 1985. The PATBILL file covers all hospital discharges paid for
by Medicare during fiscal year 1984 (October 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984).
The PATBILL file containsinformation on patient characteristics such asage,
sex, race and diagnosis as well as measures of hospital utilization such as
length of stay and incurred charges. The AHA and POS files contain information
on hospital characteristics. These include the number of beds, hospital
teaching status, location of the hospital and ownership category. Table 1 defi-
nes and indicates the data source for selected variables used in the empirical
analyses presented below. The means and standard deviations are also reported.
In 1984 there were roughly 346,000 psychiatric and substance abuse
discharges reported in the PATBILL data. Of these, 41 per cent were in Major
Diagnosis Category (MDC) 19- the psychiatric DRGs while 57 per cent were in
MDC 20 the substance abuse. Considering MDC 19 discharges only the discharges
from freestanding psychiatric hospitals comprise 18.6 percent of the total.
Discharges from general hospitals accounted for 81.4 percent, with 47 percent
from general hospitals with psychiatric units and 34 percent from hospitals with
no unit. Hospitals without psychiatric units made up 78 per cent of the
general hospitals in the data set.- 9-.
However, in order to examine the effect of PPS on patient length of
stay, we limited our analysis to discharges of patients from general hospitals
with no psychiatric units -thepure scatterbed patients. We concentrate on
this subset of patients and hospitals for essentially three reasons. First, as
noted above, psychiatric units in general hospitals could apply for an exemption
from PPS and continue to be paid under TEFRA. Thus, if one were to Study the
impact of PPS on the psychiatric units that chose to receive PPS reimbursement,
one would have to take into account the decision not to seek the exemption in
order to obtain unbiased estimates of the PPS effect. This is a complicated
matter for a preliminary analysis. Second, for hospitals that treat patients
both in psychiatric units and in scatterbeds, the patients treated in scatter—
beds in unit hospitals are likely to be different from the patients treated in
hospitals with no units. Finally, for hospitals with units under PPS it is
impossible to distinguish between a discharge from a unit and a discharge from a
scatterbed, while for hospitals with exempt units, one can distinguish between
them only after the hospital was exempted from PPS. For all of these reasons we
chose to focus on the pure scatterbed discharges. There were 74,416 discharges
from pure scatterbeds. However, in order to control computer costs, we selected
a 10 per cent random sample of discharges.
The selection criteria led to a systematic selection of hospitals and
psychiatric patients. For example, relative to the population of all psychi-
atric discharges1those from hospitals outside of Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) were overrepresented in the analysis file. Forty-five per cent of the
discharges were from hospitals outside of MSAs while 7.2 percent were from
hospitals in central cities. The diagnostic mix and demographic composition is
similar to that found in all scatterbeds (it should be remembered that scatter-
beds in hospitals with units have been excluded) but quite different from the-10-
mix in units. Twenty-nine percent of the patients in scatterbeds had a ORG of
psychosis compared to 70 percent in the exempt psychiatric units. Thirty-four
percent of scatterbed patients were diagnosed as having an organic disorder
relative to 11 percent of the discharges from psychiatric units. Clearly, these
substantial differences across treatment settings limit the breadth of the
generalizations that can be made based on the specific estimates obtained from
the analysis of scatterbed discharges.
There is, however, a different type of selection issue that needs to be
addressed. Was the population of patients treated in scatterbeds different
before and after the implementation of PPS? If it was, then any decrease in
observed or estimated length of stay in response to PPS might be due not to
differences in hospital practice patterns but rather to differences in the
inpatient population arising from changed hospital sorting patterns. To address
this issue, we first analyzed the flow of discharges from scatterbed hospitals
and then we analyzed the diagnostic mix of patients before and after PPS.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 1984, the monthly flow of discharges ranged from 6.8
percent to 9.0 percent of total discharges.The portion of FY 84 patients
discharged during the first three months of fiscal year 1984, when most hospi-
tals had not yet come under PPS, was 25.7 percent. The share of FY 84
discharges in the last three months of fiscal year 1984, when almost all hospi-
tals were on PPS, was 23.1 percent. This is not a significant difference.3
Table 2 reports the diagnostic composition of scatterbed discharges pre
and post PPS. There appear to be no significant changes in diagnostic mix
related to PPS. The share of discharges accounted for by ORG 425 (acute adjust-
ment reaction) and ORG 429 (Organic Illness) did decrease slightly while the
share accounted for by DRG43O (Psychoses) increased slightly.Thus, if
anything is reflected by such changes, it is a shift in patient composition—11—
toward patients who are somewhat more difficult to manage. Other explanations
such as "ORG creep" are also consistent with the change. In conclusion, the
available evidence suggests that it is probably reasonable to assume (as we do)
that no major changes in patient sorting occurred during the change from TEFRA
to PPS.
b. Specifications
The length of stay of individual discharges is hypothesized to be a
function of three classes of explanatory variables -patientcharacteristics,
hospital cost characteristics, and the set of rules under which the hospital is
paid (Ellis and McGuire 1986 and Seidman and Frank 1986). The characteristics
of the patients treated will be a major factor influencing how long they stay in
the hospital. The type of treatment provided will depend on the patient's cli-
nical conditions, his age, and the patient's support system. The patient's
response to treatment and his subsequent clinical status, in part, determine the
feasibility of discharging a patient and the consequences of such action.
A second set of factors is related to the structure of hospital costs. As
discussed above, the marginal cost of a hospital day defines the rate at which
hospitals exhaust their net revenues in a per case prospective payment system.
For this reason hospital characteristics which underlie the cost structure
serve to constrain a hospitaUs decision making regarding an individual
patient's stay. Finally, the incentives contained in the payment system are
constraints a hospital faces in pursuit of its goals such as providing quality
care and obtaining net revenues.
In order to analyze the length of stay, one must have measures for each
of the factors affecting length of stay.In this paper, clinical charac-
teristics of patients are measured by the patient's DRG, age, sex, race and—12—
Medicare eligibility status. We characterize patient diagnoses by using the
DRGs in MDC19. The age variable is specified as a quadratic function. This
reflects the cormion finding of an inverse U shaped relation between age and
health care utilization. The presence of information on Medicare eligibility
status allows for the differentiation between individuals qualifying for
Medicare because of age versus disability status. The psychiatric inpatient who
is disabled is quite likely to be chronically mentally ill and may have dif-
ferent patterns of use than acutely ill patients. The sex, race and diagnoses
measures are all specified as dichotomous dunhlly variables.
Unfortunately we cannot directly measure many of the key factors that
might be included in a hospital's cost function. We thereby rely on indirect
measures of hospital cost factors. Hospital size and ownership are included in
the model to control for economies of scale and any possible slack or X-
inefficiency sometimes hypothesized to be associated with non-profit and public
ownership (see Frech and Ginsburg, 1981). It should be pointed out that larger
hospital size has also been associated with greater severity of illness in
patient populations. Hospital teaching activities have been shown to be asso-
ciated with higher hospital costs, we therefore include a variable which indica-
tes the presence of a teaching program.4 In order to account for input cost
differences we include durmiy variables which indicates hospital location (e.g.:
central city).
The financing arrangements according to which Medicare patients are
paid are characterized in a number of ways. One might view the change in pay-
ment method as a shift in relative prices to the supplier. The change in quan-
tity supplied will therefore be explained by both a substitution and an income
effect. Salkever, Steinwachs and Rupp (1986), for example, noted that unless
hospitals were at risk of significant financial losses, relative prices at the-13-
margin may have a somewhat weak impact on hospital behavior. This is important
for model specification because it suggests that ideally one would want to
incorporate an indicator of income effect (ORG bite) for the hospital. One such
variable might be a hospital's average per case cost for a psychiatric patient
relative to the ORG payment for psychiatric patients. While we do not measure
this directly, most of the hospital characteristics along with geographic duniny
variables (both state and region specific) are explanatory variables for such an
income effect.5 Due to data limitations we rely on only direct PPSmeasures to
characterize the relative price change.
We use three measures to capture the effect of PPS. The first is a
dunwy variable indicating whether the hospital was paid for treating a given
patient under PPS rules. The second measure, TIMEPRIOR, represents how many
days prior to the implementation of PPS a given discharge occurred. The third
measure, TIMEPOST, indicates how many days after the implementation of PPS, the
discharge occurred. As we argued above, it is unlikely that the hospital would
respond instantaneously to the implementation of PPS. We would expect that
hospitals would anticipate the implementation of PPS and would begin to imple-
ment new procedures to control the use of hospital resources prior to PPS. On
the other hand, after the implementation of PPS it becomes more costly not to
reduce length of stay to the equilibrium level. Thus one would expect that
adjustment would occur relatively quickly. We hypothesize that length of stay
would increase as TIMEPRIOR to PPS increases, and that length of stay would
fall as TIMEPOST increases. Since hospitals came under PPS at different times
of the year, the TIMEPRIOR and the TIMEPOST variables will differ across
hospitals. About 16 percent of the hosptials began PPS on October 1, 1983 while
24 percent began on January 1, 1984 and 36 percent started on July 1, 1984.6-14-
Finally, we include a number of variables to control for possible con-
founding factors. They include a variable indicating whether a patient was
admitted on a weekend (Friday, Saturday or Sunday). Cannoodt and Knickman
(1984) found this variable to have a positive impact on length of stay.
Geographic dumy variables are included (both state and regional). Length of
stay has been hypothesized to vary during various parts of the calendar year.
For example, hospitals and physicians may be more reluctant to discharge patients
with little coninunity support during the winter than in the sumer. To take
account of this factor we include a dumy variable which takes on a value of one
during the winter months and zero otherwise (November through March). Whether a
patient was discharged against medical advice (AMA) was also measured. Finally
we control for level of urbanization by using five duniny variables which
describe the size of the MSA, central city versus suburban location, and a rural
area indicator.
The basic length of stay model which we have just described assumed
that PPS effects could largely be captured as direct effects. We relax that
assumption and assess interaction effects. In particular, we assess PPS
interactions with hospital ownership. It may be that hospitals without the
backing of public budgets (privately owned) may have larger responses to changed
incentives than publicly owned providers.7
In formulating the empirical model, the dependent variable was trans-
formed into logarithms. One reason for the logarithmic transformation of length
of stay is to make the dependent variable approximately normal. However, ordi-
nary least squares tends to be quite robust when departures from normality occur.
A more important reason for transforming length of stay is the assumption that PPS
will not effect all parts of the length of stay distribution with the same abso-
lute magnitude. It seems more reasonable to assume that PPS will have a propor-—15—
tional effect on the length of stay (that is, that the length of stay of both
the long stay cases and the short stay cases will fall by x percent) than it is
to assume that PPS will have a linear effect on length of stay (that is that
both long stay and short stay cases will experience a given decrease in their
length of stay).B
The model was estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Since
the individual discharge is the unit of observation in this analysis andgroups
of patients are discharged from the same hospitals variance estimates basedon
ordinary least squares regressions may be biased due to autocorrelation.
Generalized least squares would be appropriate in this case. However, with a
10% random sample the numbers of discharges from each hospital are small and
makes intrahospital covariance estimates not very meaningful. Because we were
interested in determining not only the PPS effect but also how sensitive the
estimated effect was to the way the PPS variable was measured, we estimated
three separate regressions. In Model I the PPS variable is specified as a
single duniny variable. In Model II the PPS impact is measured by three
variables, TIMEPRIOR, TIMEPOST and the PPS dumy (PPSIND). In Model III the
three PPS variables are included plus a PPS-ownership interaction term. The
results are presented in Table 3. Overall the models account for about 12 per-
cent of the variation in the length of stay of Medicare psychiatric patients.
Although the R2 are low, they are comparable to those obtained by other
investigators who have analyzed the length of stay of individual patients (Frank
and Lave 1986b, McGuire, Dickey and Shively 1986, and Taube et al 1984). The
R2s were 0.12, 0.12 and 0.11 respectively. The parameter estimates for the
three models presented on Table 3 are consistent with both our expectations and
with previous research.-16—
The results of primary interest are those that offer insight into the
impact of PPS on length of stay. Model I characterizes PPS by a single dunny
variable. Models II and III attempt to capture the full adjustment to PPS by
attributing to PPS reductions before implementation due to anticipation and
reductions following implementation due to slow adjustment. Since we charac-
terize PPS in this manner it is important to carefully define the comparison
that is being made. By considering both anticipatory and slow adjustment types
of behavior we are estimating a 365 day PPS impact for a typical hospital (one
that went on PPS in March) relative to TEFRA.9 This specification should lead
to larger estimates than those resulting from inclusion of a single PPS duniny
variable. In the case of an immediate adjustment in length of stay at the time
that a hospital implements PPS the single dunuiy approach and our more compli-
cated formulation would yield identical results. That is, the TIMEPRIOR and
TIMEPOST variables would have coefficients of zero and the PPS durmy would cap-
ture the full effect.
The components of the PPS impact estimate can be seen on Table 3. The
coefficients for the TIMEPRIOR and TIMEPOST variables indicate that adjustment
was not instantaneous on the PPS implementation date. The positive coefficient
for the TIMEPRIOR variable suggests that for every day one moves away from the
PPS implementation date length of stay is increased. This, of course, also
means that as the PPS starting date becomes closer length of stay falls)0
Similarly, the TIMEPOST coefficient estimate is negative and significant which
means that hospitals continue to cut length of stay after the PPS starting date.
These coefficients taken together indicate that PPS implementation took place
continuously over the observed time period. The TIMEPOST coefficient is larger
in absolute value than the TIMEPRIOR coefficient. This was expected since the
cost of adjustment to the new equilibrium after PPS has gone into effect is—17—
greater than the adjustment cost under TEFRA since marginal revenues for each
day under PPS are zero. Thus, the hospital that had not fully adjusted by the
time PPS took effect had a strong incentive to reach its new equilibrium relati-
vely quickly. Using an incremental F test, the two groups of coefficients in
Models II and III are significantly different from zero.11
The PPS dumy had a negative and statistically significant impact on
length of stay even when the TIMEPRIOR and TIMEPOST variables were included in
the model the coefficient ranged from -0.049 to -0.064 indicating a 5 to 6 per-
cent shift in length of stay. This suggests that the impact of PPS became
stronger at the time of implementation. The estimated 365 day effect can there-
fore be characterized in a manner illustrated in Figure 1. The discontinuity at
thePPS start date shows the impact of the PPS dumy. Note also that the slope
of the PPS adjustment curve is steeper following the start of PPS than itwasin
thetime prior to PPS. This reflects the magnitudes of the TIMEPRIOR and
TIMEPOST coefficients.
Table 4 suninarizes the estimated PPS effects for the three regression
models. The three models indicate declines in length of stay associated with
implementation of PPS of 13 percent for Model I, 16.5 percent for Model II and
17 percent for Model III. Since the for-profit sector is relatively small and
the coefficient estimates rather stable in the two models the addition of the
PPS-ownership interaction changes little. As expected the 365 day PPS impacts
are substantially larger in magnitude than the PPS impact obtained using only
the PPS dumy variable. Thus we may view the 13 percent decline in length of
stay as a conservative lower bound estimate and the 17 percent decline as an
upper bound. The estimated 365 day PPS impacts are calculated on the basis of a
weighted average of days prior and days post. This allowed us to consider the
situation of the average: hospital given that hospitals were phased into PPS-18-
throughout the fiscal year. The point estimate of the PPS impact varies as one
considers different points at which a hospital might have con,'nenced PPS. Again,
because our prior reasoning suggest that a logarithmic transformation is most
reasonable we focus on those results.
Table 4 also shows the "raw" decreases in length of stay. These num-
bers compare the average lengths of stay of all discharges which occurred prior
to PPS with those after PPS.In absolute terms, the average length of stay fell
from 9.14 days to 7.24 days. This represents a decrease in the arithmetic mean
of 20.4 percent. In constrast the geometric mean declined by 12 percent. As
indicated above, unless detailed investigations of the length of stay show
otherwise, we think that it is more likely that the lengths of stay of all cases
fell by 12 percent than it is that the length of stay of each type of case in
the DRG class fell by 1.9 days. It is also of interest to note that the
decrease in the geometric mean length of stay of 12 percent is almost identical
to the PPS effect estimated in Model I.
One must exercise some caution in interpreting the results.
Attributing the full effect captured by the TIMEPRIOR, TIMEPOST and PPSIND
variables may lead to overstating the effect of PPS. Since the TIMEPRIOR and
TIMEPOST in part will reflect secular trends in length of stay one must examine
recent trends in psychiatric length of stay .Usingdata from the National
Hospital Discharge Survey (HDS) we examined the average length of stay for the
United States as a whole and for the greater than 65 year old age group for
1980 through 1983. Those data suggest that for the entire population
psychiatric length of stay has risen slightly (11.6 days to 12.4 days). For the
greater than 65 years old segment of the population length of stay remained
essentially constant (13.7 days to 13.5 days).'2 Thus it is unlikely that a
secular trend in length of stay is a dominant factor in interpreting the PPS-19-
results. A second issue relates to the possibility that our measure of antici-
patory effects in part represents slow adjustments to TEFRA. This is clearly a
possibility. However, the age specific national length of stay data suggest
little impact of TEFRA in 1983. Thus, virtually the entire TEFRA effect would
be occurring with at least a one year lag. While some lagged impact is probable
the lack of a one year effect leads us to believe that its magnitude is small.
Few of the hospital characteristics specified in the model had signifi-
cant impacts on length of stay. Hospital size was estimated to have a positive
and significant effect on length of stay. Hospital ownership appeared to have
little effect on length of stay, neither did the teaching variable. This may in
part be because we measure the presence of any teaching activity (residency
program) rather than specific psychiatric training. Although one would expect
little psychiatric training in general hospitals without a psychiatric unit.
Variables capturing the time of admission were not significantly dif-
ferent from zero at conventional levels. The WEEKEND variable did have the
expected positive sign. The WINTER variable had a negative sign which was
counter to our hypothesis. To some extent this weak result should not be
surprising since winter means such different things in the various regions of
the country.
Several patient characteristics had important impacts on length of
stay. Patient gender and race were both significantly related to length of stay.
Females had significantly longer stays than men (approximately 7% after
adjusting for the semilog form of the model). Non-whites had stays that were
about 16 percent longer than those of whites. Finally, the diagnoses were esti-
mated to be important determinants of length of stay. DRGs 425, 426, 427, 429,
and 431 all had significantly shorter stays than did the reference category.
The DRGs as a group explained roughly 4.5 percent of the variation in length of-20-
stay (when run alone against length of stay). This is quite consistent with the
findings of Taube et al. (1984) and Frank and Lave (1986b).
VI. Discussion
In this section we attempt to place the results for the PPS impact in
the context of other recent studies of length of stay. Table 5 again suninarizes
our results and presents the results of two recent studies of per case payment
systems based on DRG5.
The Prospective Payment Assessment Con,nission (PROPAC) study reports
results based upon the 1984 PATBILL file for all Medicare hospital discharges.
Their decrease in lengths of stay are calculated by comparing the arithmatic
mean of pre PPS discharges with that of post PPS discharges. The overall
decline in length of stay "attributable" to PPS was 7.6 percent. They also
reported results that are disaggregated by class of DRG (medical vs. surgical)
and market type (rural vs. urban). For the medical DRGs, declines in length of
stay associated with PPS were considerably more dramatic than for the overall
Medicare population. Medical DRG cases treated in rural hospitals had on
average an 11 percent fall in length of stay during 1984 following implemen-
tation of PPS. Similarly medical cases treated in urban hospitals had a 12.9
percent drop in length of stay. Declines for surgical DRGs were substantially
smaller (3.5 and 1.7%).
Recent work by Rosko and Broyles (1986) found that the New Jersey per
case prospective payment system was associated with 3.4 percent lower lengths of
stay than in hospitals paid under the parallel prospective per diem rate setting
system. The New Jersey study focuses on the hospital as the unit of analysis
which means the findings are not entirely analagous to those based on individual
discharge data.—21—
Propac has called the 7.6 percent decrease in length of stay associated
with PPS "striking", (p.62). Since our analysis indicates that hospitals began
to adjust to the incentives embedded in PPS before they actually came under it,
the raw comparison of means will provide an underestimate of the complete PPS
effect. However, it is clear that PPS had a larger effect on the length of stay
of psychiatric patients in scatterbeds than it did overall. The observed
decrease in the "raw" length of stay of psychiatric patients associated with PPS
was 20.4 percent. This is a much larger decrease in length of stay than was
observed for any group of general Medicare discharges. Although we have taken
issue with using the decrease in the arithmetic mean length of stay as an indi-
cator of PPS impact, it is clear that the conclusion would not be changed if we
compared changes in the geometric mean length of stay.
The supply response to PPS for psychiatric patients is large, par-
ticularly when it is observed over a single year. The reduction in psychiatric
length of stay is particularly impressive given the fact there is little evi-
dence of a time trend towards shorter lengths of stay. This finding is con-
sistent with the notion that there is considerable flexibility in the treatment
of psychiatric inpatients relative to medical or surgical patients. The impli-
cations of hospitals exercising this flexibility are not clear. For example,
one explanation for the dramatic response to PPS is that there was substantial
waste of resources in the delivery of hospital based psychiatric care under
TEFRA. In such a case an average length of stay of 7.24 days may be consistent
with high quality psychiatric care delivered at least cost. A second hypothesis
suggested by the work of Frank and Lave (1985b) is that patients may be shifted
to other types of providers of mental health care. This could be undesirable if
the referrals were not clinically appropriate. A third possibility is that
pointed to by Rupp and her colleagues (1984) which is that readmissions increase-22-
in response to lower lengths of stay. This would not be consistent with high
quality care delivered at least cost. Which of these competing explanations
dominates is not known. However, it is important to develop information to
reveal whether undertreatment is occurring so that the social benefits asso-
ciated with the observed declines in length of stay can be evaluated.
Substantial concern has been raised by the work of Freiman et al.
(1986) and the NAPPH (1986) as to the financial status of providers of
psychiatric care under PPS. While our results do not directly address this
issue, they do suggest that if supply responses for psychiatric units and
psychiatric hospitals are at all similar to those found for scatterbeds, simula-
tions of payments that do not incorporate such response may be seriously
misleading. Large supply responses over a single year indicate an ability to
quickly reduce per case costs of treating psychiatric inpatients. It is this
ability that is a crucial determinant of the financial performance of hospitals
under PPS. Moreover, our results indicate that for-profit hospitals have only
slightly more flexibility in reducing length of stay than do either the public
or non—profit general hospitals.13 Thus an important implication of our analy-
sis is that there may be an overemphasis, in recent policy discussions, on pro-
tecting hospitals from losses. Instead one might focus attention on protecting
patients who might be hurt by dramatic supply response. Of course, in the long
run if the payment system is tightened and not refined, the issue of loser
hospitals may become quite important.
Several important limitations to our analysis need to be pointed out.
The most obvious and probably most significant is that our sample consists of
"pure scatterbeds." The extent to which these hospitals respond to PPS in ways
similar to psychiatric hospitals and psychiatric units is not known. We do not
know that rural hospitals are overrepresented among the "pure scatterbeds." The-23-
psychiatric case mix in the hospitals analyzed here is different from that found
in psychiatric units and psychiatric hospitals. A second limitation is the
dearth of information on mental health status among the sample discharges.
Variables such as previous history of mental health care use, and educational
attainment were not available. Our theoretical framework called for the inclu-
sion of an income effect. While there are some econometric difficulties in spe-
cifying such a variable in our model, it would be desirable to experiment with a
direct income effect measure. Since we observe discharges over only one year
with some hospitals beginning PPS on the first day, our data is censored.
Thus, anticipatory behavior prior to October 1, 1983 is missed.
Finally because adjustment to TEFRA may have been slow, some of the
adjustment attributed to PPS may in fact be due to TEFRA. Again, because length
of stay did not decline in 1983 we believe the magnitude of the slow TEFRA
adjustment is probably small.
In conclusion our analysis provides a first glimpse at the hospital
supply response for psychiatric patients paid for under PPS. That glimpse
suggests a larger response than observed for medical patients paid for by
Medicare and relative to the experience in New Jersey. The results suggest that
adjustment to the new payment system was not immediate but rather took place
continuously over the phase-in year. Moreover, the adjustment process appears
to have accelerated as the P1'S start date approached. This also indicates
hospital sensitivity to financial incentives. The approach to characterizing
the PPS effect suggests that calculation of winners and losers under PPS must be
mindful of a hospital's ability to dramatically alter per case costs. Finally,
the strong response observed in this analysis makes it even more critical to




























Medicare Status 15.7 PATBILL
(Disabled) (36.4)TABLE 2
DIAGNOSTIC MIX IN SCATI'ERBEDS
PRE PND POST PPS













Nosignificant differences using a test of proportionsTABLE 3
RRESSION RESULTS
(DependentVariable =LNLOS)*
VARIABLE MODEL I MODEL II MODELIII
Age 0.011 0.009 0.010
(2.35) (2.00) (2.37)
Age2 —0. 006e2 —0. 004e2 —0. 004e2
(1.67) (1.32) (1.67
Sex 0.073 0.063 0.067
(lFemale) (3.59) (3.14) (3.31)
Race 0.167 0.166 0.154
(1=Nonwhite) (5.29) (5.19) (4.90)
Medicare Status 0.045 0.039 0.039
(1=Aged) (0.99) (0.85) (0.86)
Admission Day 0.025 0.022 0.019
(1=Weekend) (1.26) (1.11) (0.99)
DRG
424 0.351 0.346 0.348
(5.45) (5.38) (5.41)
425 —0.477 —0.478 —0.471
(15.03) (—15.06) (14.95)
426 —0.119 —0.121 —0.122
(4.00) (4.09) (4.09)
427 —0.234 —0.233 —0.245
(2.89) (2.88) (3.03)
428 —0.9075 —0.071 —0.050
—(0.71) —(0.68) —(.48)
429 —0.061 —0.061 —0.062
(2.35) (2.33) (2.36)
430 —0.047 —0.051 0.019
(0.29) (0.32) —(0.12)
431 —0.341 —0.341 —0.345































































































PPSDummy (Model I) —13%
365 day effect (Model II) —16.5%
365 day effect with interactions
(Model III) —17.0%
1 (1.9/9.14) =20.4%
2 In LOSpp— INLOSPOST =1.80—1.68=0.12
bppg -bpjX(TIMEPRIOR)+bpx (TIMEPOST)
See3add bpp5 XPROFIT(PROFIT)TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE IMPACTS ON LENGTH OF STAY
Raw PPS—TEFRA(Linear) —20.4%
Comparison for Psychiatric Cases
Raw PPS -TEFRA(Log)
Comparisonfor Psychiatric Cases —12.0%
PPS —TEFRA(PPSdununy only) —13.0%
Comparison for psychiatric cases
365 day PPS —TEFRA -16.5%
Comparison for Psychiatric Cases
Overall Medicare PPS —TEFRA —7.6%
Comparison (PPAC)
PROPAC Rural Medical —11.0%
DRGs (PPS vs. TEFRA)
PROPAC Urban Medical —12.9%
DRG (PPS vs. TEFRA)
PROPAC Rural Surgical —3.5%
DRGs (PPS vs. TEFRA)
PROPAC Urban Surgical —1.7%
DRGs (PPS vs PEFRA)
Overall New Jersey DRGs -3.4%
versus Per Diem Rates
(Rosko and Broyles 1986)FOOTNOTES
Criteria for exemption of a psychiatric unit are outlined in Section 405.471
of Medicare regulations. Three criteria regarding diagnoses of patients,
qualification and presence of treatment personnel and maintenance of medical
records were articulated in the regulations.
2Ad st nt is costly in that practice patterns must be altered, contracts mu oen be concludedor renegotiated, administrative procedures must be
altered. These costs are not explicitly reimburseable.
3. This is particularly remarkable when one considersthat the last 3 months of
the fiscal year are July, August and September.
4. Sloan, Feldman and Steinwald (1983) reviewthe evidence on this. They find
that most of the differences in costscan be accounted for by casemix and
physician payment factors. However, sinceour measures of a number of
hospital features are limited we includeteaching status as a control
variable.
5. If one were specifying an instrumental
variables solution to this problem,
one would probably choose teaching study,size, inner city location,
ownership and geographic region as instruments. This issensible since a key factor in the wealth effect is thehospital's cost structure. Moreover,
inclusion of these variables along witha wealth effect indicator may lead
to collinearity problems and bias becausethe wealth effect indicator and
the error term will be correlated.
Unfortunately, one cannot identify the
wealth effect from the instruments.
6. These measures are of coursesubject to measurement error because they
measure the distance between discharge and PPS.Admission might be a more
appropriate measure if stays are long.
7.It has become popular to estimate the'total effects' evaluated at themean of all the interacting variables. Thispractice is accompanied by
construction of a confidence interval for thatestimate. That test is some..
what narrow since the estimate of the totaleffect will vary with values of
the interaction variables. We prefer tomore general incremental F test of
the joint hypotheses thatgroup of coefficients comprising the total effect
are significantly different from zero.
8. One implication of the logarithmictransormation of the dependent variable
is that dumy variable coefficients must beadjusted. Assume the following
general model
Ln V =a+b1X1 +c1d
C1 is actually an estimate of
C1 =in(i+g) where g x 100 is the percent change in V
attributable to a.Toobtain an estimate of g C1 must be transformed inthe
following manner
g =exp(C1 -½V (C1)3 -1
where V(C1) is the variance of the coefficientestimate. Thus if V(C1) is
large g and c1 may be quite different. This is derivedby Kennedy (1981).FOOTNOTES (continued)
9. We use 365 days because that is the period for which we observed hospital
behavior. Clearly the longer or shorter you make the adjustment period
the bigger or smaller is the PPS impact. However, it seems sensible to use
the time period from which the coefficient estimates were made.
10. We specified a PPS case as one that was admitted after a hospital began PPS.
We also experimented with discharge after PPS. The results were not sensi-
tive to these differences




D=isthe vector of PPS effects
12. NCHS (1983, 1984, 1985 report average length of stay for psychiatric
discharges in the nation as a whole and for those over 65 years of age as
follows:
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983
All Ages 11.6 11.9 12.1 12.4
65+ 13.7 13.3 13.0 13.5
13. To illustrate this point with a simple example Freiman et al. report that
in Michigan psychiatric patients in all hospitals would on average lose
$255 per case. Assuming a modest 15% reduction in average cost due to PPS
the average loss might well become an average gain of $187. This, of
course, is a rough back of the envelope calculation.